Most states now fund merit-based financial aid programs, the effects of which depend on how strongly students react to changes in college costs. I estimate such reactions using quasiexperimental aspects of a recent Massachusetts merit scholarship program intended to attract talented students to the state's public colleges. Despite its small monetary value, the Adams Scholarship induced 6% of winners to choose four-year public colleges instead of four-year private colleges, suggesting an elasticity of demand for public college enrollment above unity. Nonetheless, most funds flowed to students who would have enrolled in public colleges absent the scholarship and the aid had no effect on winners' overall college enrollment rate, which already exceeded 90%. Regression discontinuity estimates are larger than those from difference-in-difference specifications because winners with relatively low academic skill, and thus nearest the treatment threshold, reacted much more strongly to the price change than did highly skilled winners. Conditional on academic skill, low-income winners reacted similarly to their higher income peers, suggesting that previous research may have mistaken income heterogeneity for skill heterogeneity. * For their helpful comments, I thank Janet Currie, Susan Dynarski, Jonathan Gruber, Thomas Kane, David Lee, Johannes Schmieder, Miguel Urquiola and two anonymous referees. I am also grateful to Robert Lee at the Massachusetts Department of Education, who generously provided me with data and explanations of Massachusetts' school system.
1 in the year before and after the scholarship began. 4 Second, the assignment of the scholarship on the basis of test scores allows a regression discontinuity design that compares college intentions of students just above and below the eligibility threshold.
This paper makes four contributions to the literature on financial aid generally and merit-based scholarships specifically. First, the Adams Scholarship grants students much less money than do the most widely studied merit scholarships, allowing measurement of students' reactions to financial incentives that are arguably quite small. Second, the analysis uses a clean quasi-experiment and student-level data for every Massachusetts high school graduate from [2003] [2004] [2005] , making the estimated effects very precise and robust to alternative specifications. Third, the scholarship's design allows comparison of the performance of difference-in-difference and regression discontinuity estimators. Fourth, the differing results from these estimators can be explained by heterogeneity in price sensitivity among students of varying academic skill. This is the first paper to demonstrate such heterogeneity, which may help explain the variety of results from previous quasi-experimental studies of the effect of financial aid.
The primary result is that, despite its small monetary value, the Adams Scholarship induced 6% of winners to choose four-year public colleges instead of four-year private colleges, suggesting an elasticity of demand for public college enrollment above unity. Nonetheless, most funds flowed to students who would have enrolled in public colleges absent the scholarship and the aid had no effect on winners' overall college enrollment rate, which already exceeded 90%. Regression discontinuity estimates are larger than those from difference-in-difference specifications because winners with relatively low academic skill, and thus nearest the treatment threshold, reacted much more strongly to the price change than did highly skilled winners. Conditional on academic skill, low-income winners reacted similarly to their higher income peers, suggesting that previous research may have mistaken income heterogeneity for skill heterogeneity.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 reviews previous literature on the effects of financial aid and merit scholarships. Section 2 explains the details of the Adams Scholarship. Section 3 reviews the data and describes the population of students in question. Sections 4 and 5 respectively use difference-in-difference and regression discontinuity methodologies to estimate the scholarship's impact on students' college intentions, while Section 6 explores heterogeneity in these impacts by academic skill. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of these findings' implications.
Previous Literature
This paper builds on three strands in the economics literature, the first of which focuses on students' elasticity of demand for college education. A large and growing quasi-experimental literature has exploited plausibly exogenous changes in college costs to accurately identify this elasticity. Such quasi-experiments include discontinuities in a college's financial aid formula, as in van der Klaauw (2001) ; changes in Pell grant rules, as in Seftor and Turner (2002) ; the effect of GI bills, as in Bound and Turner (2002) ; and elimination of Social Security student benefits, as in Dynarski (2003) . According to Dynarski (2002) , these studies consistently suggest that eligibility for $1,000 in annual aid raises college attendance rates by about 4 percentage points but are split as to whether college subsidies have a greater impact on low-or high-income students. The central result of this literature is that financial aid has a substantial impact on the college decisions of American high school graduates.
The second strand evaluates merit scholarship programs specifically. Dynarski (2000) analyzes Georgia's HOPE Scholarship Program, which aimed to raise low college attendance rates by eliminating tuition (roughly $3,500 in 2005$) at Georgia's public colleges for state residents with at least a B average in high school, regardless of income. With other southeastern states as controls, Dynarski's difference-in-difference estimates using the Current Population Survey suggest that introduction of the program increased Georgia's college attendance rate by over 7 percentage points, though the effect was due almost entirely to the strong reactions of white students. Cornwell et al. (2006) update this analysis using the National Center for Education Statistics' Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), which reports institutional enrollments by students' original states of residence. They roughly agree with Dynarski's estimate of the increased attendance rate, but conclude that both black and white students exhibited such an increase. They also estimate that much of the increase stemmed from students choosing Georgia institutions over out-of-state ones, and that ultimately only 15% of scholarship winners changed their college decision based on the increased aid. Kane (2003) evaluates California's CalGrant program, which primarily aimed to ease capacity constraints in the state's public postsecondary system by giving grants worth most if used at private colleges (up to $11,000 in 2005$) to federal financial aid applicants who had achieved a minimum high school GPA and fell below certain income and asset limits. Kane uses detailed student information from federal financial aid applications and exploits the multiple discontinuities inherent in the program design (minimum GPA, maximum income and maximum assets). That the GPA threshold was determined late in the process by state funding availability eliminates the possibility that students more desirous of aid tried "to claw their way above the threshold," which would invalidate the smoothness assumption underlying regression discontinuity designs. Kane concludes that the grants caused a 3-4 percentage point rise in college enrollment among financial aid applicants and caused the lowest income applicants to more than double their rate of private college attendance (from 15% to over 30%).
The above papers make clear that merit-based financial aid can significantly impact a student's decision whether to attend college and, if so, whether in the public or private sector. Dynarski's and Kane's estimates are, however, hard to compare because the former measures a treatment effect averaged over all scholarship winners while the latter measures a treatment effect only for those near the eligibility threshold. The third strand that this paper therefore relates to is the tradition begun by LaLonde (1986) and more recently reviewed by Ham and LaLonde (2005) comparing experimental evaluations to non-experimental evaluations of public policies. The design of the Adams Scholarship allows comparison of difference-in-difference and regression discontinuity methods, as well as offering clear evidence on the heterogeneous treatment effects that lead to differences in estimates derived from these two methods. No previous paper on merit aid has done this. 5 , which would waive tuition at in-state public colleges for any student whose total MCAS score placed her in the top 25% statewide. At a meeting of the state Board of Higher Education, Governor Romney explained that "the Abigail and John Adams Scholarship will attract Massachusetts students to stay in Massachusetts by providing a special incentive to our brightest students.... It is a priority to attract the very best students to our public colleges." 6 Concerned that Governor Romney's statewide standard would assign scholarships largely to students in wealthy, high-performing school districts, the state Board of Higher Education ultimately approved a modified version of the program in October 2004, nine months after the original proposal and thus a year and half after the scholarships' first recipients, the class of 2005, had taken their MCAS exams. Under the modified version, a student receives a tuition waiver if her total MCAS score falls in the top 25% of scores in her school district and scores in the "advanced" (≥260) category on one portion and the "proficient" (≥240) or "advanced" category on the other. Figure 1 provides a graphical interpretation of scholarship eligibility in a typical mediumperforming school district. About half of the graduates attend such districts (those with cutoff scores between 502 and 518), where the cutoff score interacts with the proficient/advanced threshold in a complex way. Students must pass the proficient/advanced threshold represented by the thick solid line and must also achieve their own district's cutoff score, represented by the thick dashed line. Scholarship winners are those students whose test scores fall in the shaded region. In low-performing districts (with cutoff scores of 500 or lower), the cutoff is so low that passing the proficient/advanced threshold is sufficient to win a scholarship, whereas in high-performing districts (with cutoff scores of 520 or higher), the cutoff is so high that passing it alone is sufficient to win. These complexities will inform construction of the eligibility variable to be used in section 5's regression discontinuity estimates.
Scholarship winners are automatically notified in the fall of their senior year, which eliminates the selection bias potentially confounding evaluations of aid programs that require applications. The scholarship waives tuition at any of fifteen (two-year) community colleges, seven (four-year) 5 The eponymous couple placed great value on education. John Adams wrote, in 1780, that "I must study politics and war that my sons may have liberty to study mathematics and philosophy. My sons ought to study mathematics and philosophy, geography, natural history, naval architecture, navigation, commerce, and agriculture, in order to give their children a right to study painting, poetry, music, architecture, statuary, tapestry, and porcelain." His wife, Abigail Adams, may have agreed with her husband's sentiment but not with his single-sex phrasing of the issue. She once wrote, "It is really mortifying, sir, when a woman possessed of a common share of understanding considers the difference of education between the male and female sex, even in those families where education is attended to." Mrs. Adams would likely have been pleased that women constituted the majority of the first class of scholarship winners. 6 Minutes of the June 15, 2004 meeting can be found at http://www.mass.edu/p p/home.asp?id=5. state colleges, or four University of Massachusetts (U. Mass.) campuses. 7 Receipt of the scholarship does not, however, eliminate the cost of college attendance, as Table 1 shows. In fall 2005, tuition at individual public colleges in Massachusetts ranged from only 16-24% of the direct cost of attendance, with mandatory fees not covered by the scholarship comprising the remaining 76-84%. The average annual (total) value of the Adams Scholarship was therefore $740 ($1480) for community college students, $961 ($3,846) for state college students, and $1,575 ($6,299) for U. Mass. students. The Adams Scholarship thus differs from other studied merit-based aid programs both in award value and in its definition of merit. The maximum Adams Scholarship is roughly half the value of a HOPE award and one-sixth the value of a CalGrant award. Dynarski (2004) lists over a dozen states' merit-based aid programs in which the definition of merit includes over 30% of the student population, including some where the proportion is much greater. The Adams Scholarship, in contrast, is awarded to less than 25% of graduating Massachusetts seniors.
Of critical importance in the estimation strategies that follow is the fact that the class of 2005, the first class of scholarship recipients, took the exams that determined their treatment status long before knowing those scores could have monetary value. There is thus no reason to believe that students more desiring of scholarships tried, as Kane (2003) puts it, to "claw" their way above the thresholds. 8 This means that the imputed "winners" from years prior to 2005 should have similar observable and unobservable characteristics to actual winners from 2005, and that students who barely achieve the thresholds necessary to win the scholarship should look similar to those who barely miss those thresholds.
Two approaches to estimating the scholarship's effect are thus possible. The first explores the difference in college intentions between winners and losers, using classes prior to 2005 as a control for pre-treatment differences between these two groups. As emphasized in Athey and Imbens (2006) , this traditional difference-in-difference approach results in an estimator of the form
where Y i is the college intention of student i, W IN i is an indicator for scholarship receipt, and 2005 i is an indicator for the class of 2005. Most important is the fact that β DID represents an average treatment effect on the treated, where all of the treated students are weighted equally. The second approach is to define a variable GAP i that measures the number of points by which a student succeeded or failed to win a scholarship (i.e. GAP i = 0 is the threshold between winning and losing). In this case, a regression discontinuity estimator has the form
which Lee (2007) shows is a weighted average treatment effect where the weights are determined by an individual's likelihood of being near the threshold value of GAP i = 0. The size of the discontinuity is thus driven by those students likely to fall near the threshold, the lowest skilled winners, than those far away from it, the highest skilled winners. Differences between the estimates from these two approaches will be suggestive of heterogeneous treatment effects, which I will be able to explore in further detail in Section 6.
The Data
The data come from the Massachusetts Department of Education's Student Information Management System (SIMS) and include all graduates from the classes of 2003 and 2004, who graduated prior to the scholarship's existence, and 2005, the first class eligible for the scholarship. The most important variables are each student's MCAS scores 9 , post-graduation intentions as reported by her high school's guidance department, and a randomized school district identifier that allows me to identify students from the same district but not the district itself. The data also contain variables that will serve as controls and allow for subgroup analysis, including: gender; race; poverty status (based on participation in a reduced price lunch program); vocational education status; special education status; limited English proficiency status; and English-as-second-language status. I label students as coming from "medium poverty" districts if their graduating class had a poverty rate between 20% and 40% and "high poverty" if the poverty rate exceeded 40%.
Each student's post-graduation plan, the outcome variable of interest, falls into one of 5 categories: four-year public college; four-year private college; two-year public college; two-year private college; or other, which includes trade school, work, military, unknown plans, etc. I assign students to a graduating class based on when their guidance departments reported their postgraduation plans. I remove the 6% of students missing MCAS scores, school district identifiers, or post-graduation plans. The final sample consists of over 160,000 graduates. Table 2 shows the mean characteristics of each graduating class. In the class of 2004, 78% of students intend to enroll in some form of college, with 26% choosing four-year public colleges and 33% choosing four-year private colleges. The two-year category is dominated by public colleges, as very few students attend two-year private colleges. Also important for the subsequent analysis is that MCAS scores appear to increase slightly with time, so that an increasing proportion of students pass the proficient/advanced thresholds. About 14% of graduates are poor, and 13% are black or Hispanic.
To check that students' reported postsecondary intentions reflect actual college attendance, I used IPEDS' Residence and Migration data, which reports for each U.S. postsecondary institution the number of "first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who graduated 9 Students may retake the exam multiple times, so I use only scores from the first exam taken. Table 2 confirms this, showing the proportion of students labeled winners rising from 19.6% to 23.9% over the three years. This could bias the difference-in-difference estimator if WIN ij identifies slightly different parts of the skill distribution in different years. In sections 5 and 6, I address this potential bias with a regression discontinuity design that uses only a single year of data and with regressions that include a students' rank in the skill distribution.
Here 
where Y ij is an indicator for student i in district j planning to attend a particular type of college, 2005 ij and 2003 ij are indicators for each class, and WIN ij is the variable described above. Robust standard errors are clustered by school district (* p<0.05 ** p<0.01). P(β 1 = β 2 ) represents the p-value from a Wald test of the hypothesis β 1 = β 2 . Panels (B) and (C) include Table 2 's demographic controls fully interacted with class. In panels (A) and (B), N = 160,949. In panel (C), N = 23,479. Table 3 shows the results of these regressions from (1), with each column in each panel representing a separate regression for each college category. Reported standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered by school district to allow for intra-district correlation in ij . In panel (A), which includes no demographic controls, β 1 suggests that the scholarship induced roughly 6% of winners to choose four-year public colleges over four-year private colleges, while having no significant impact on the two-year college categories. Subtracting β 2 has relatively little effect, reducing the estimated proportion of switchers to 5%. Panel (B) adds demographic controls interacted with class to further account for potential changes in the population of winners over time. These controls change the estimates of β 1 − β 2 relatively little, continuing to suggest that the scholarship induced roughly 6% of winners to switch from four-year private colleges to four-year public colleges and thus left the overall college attendance rate unchanged. 10 Given that, as listed below panel (B), the 2004 winners' mean attendance rate at four-year public colleges was 30.7%, the scholarship seems to have induced a nearly 20% increase in the number of winners attending such colleges. That this stemmed from a 17% price decrease suggests winners' elasticity of demand for four-year public college has magnitude above unity. These may be underestimates given that some students may switch from out-of-state public colleges to in-state public colleges. These estimates therefore imply that at least 780 students (6% of the 2005 winners) were induced to switch from private to public colleges. The state reported that roughly one fourth, or 3,360, of the 2005 winners ultimately used the scholarship, suggesting that 23% (=780/3,360) of scholarship users changed their behavior due to the scholarship, while the remaining 77% had their previous behavior subsidized by the state. The marginal effects of this scholarship were thus small in comparison to the inframarginal effects, though somewhat larger than those found in Georgia by Cornwell et al. (2006) .
To test whether price sensitivity varies by income, panel (C) of Table 3 limits the sample to poor students. The estimates of β 1 − β 2 for poor students are roughly 12%, implying that scholarship's effects are twice as large for poor students as for the general population. The same regressions limited to black students show even higher coefficients, on the order of 20%. Taken as a whole, these results suggest that disadvantaged students are much more likely to take advantage of the scholarship than their more advantaged peers. In Section 6 I will argue that this heterogeneity by income may be due to heterogeneity by academic skill.
Regression Discontinuity Methodology and Results
The primary disadvantage of the difference-in-difference approach is that WIN ij may include slightly different parts of the skill distribution in different years. A regression discontinuity design eliminates this concern by focusing on only a single class. I exploit the fact that scholarship receipt is a discontinuous function of a student's test scores due to the proficient/advanced and district cutoff thresholds. Students whose scores place them just inside the dark region in Figure 1 are similar to students whose scores place them just outside those regions, yet the former receive the scholarship and the latter do not.
The major hurdle here is the complexity of the various thresholds that students must achieve in order to win the Adams Scholarship. Previous papers, such as Kane (2003) and van der Klaauw (2001), consider financial aid that is granted once students pass a single threshold that is applied uniformly to all students. Here, the location of the discontinuity varies by district. To construct a single measure that exploits the discontinuity, I first define BEST ij and W ORST ij as the highest and lowest of each student's two MCAS scores. I then define
where TOTAL ij represents the total MCAS score of student i in district j and CUTOFF j represents the cutoff score of district j. These three terms respectively represent the distance the student fell from the district cutoff threshold, the advanced threshold, and the proficient threshold (recall that a score of 260 is advanced and 240 is proficient). GAP * ij thus assigns to each student the number of points by which she failed most or succeeded least to meet one of the thresholds. By this definition, any student with GAP * ij < 0 fails to win a scholarship and any student with GAP * ij ≥ 0 has passed all the thresholds and is thus guaranteed a scholarship. Values of GAP * ij range from -132 to 20.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE (CAPTION: College Intentions vs. GAP*)]
Figure 2 graphs graduates' mean college intentions against GAP * ij and for visual purposes show only the portion for which GAP ij ≥ −20. For the 2004 graduates, two features are worth noting in panels (A), (C) and (E). First, students with higher values of GAP * ij are more likely to attend four-year private colleges and less likely to attend four-year public colleges, confirming that private colleges attract more academically talented students than do public colleges. Second, as expected, none of the panels show a discontinuity at the threshold value of GAP * ij = 0. In the right column, the graphs of 2005 graduates' college intentions have roughly the same shape as their 2004 counterparts, but panels (D) and (F) exhibit clear discontinuities at GAP * ij = 0. Compared to students who just missed winning the scholarship, students who just succeeded in winning are noticeably more likely to attend four-year public colleges and less likely to attend four-year private colleges. The apparently similar magnitude of these two discontinuities explains why the scholarship had no apparent impact on the overall college attendance rate, as shown by the lack of a discontinuity in panel (B).
To quantify the discontinuity more precisely, I run regressions of the form
where I is an indicator for GAP * ij ≥ 0. This specification fits separate lines to each side of the threshold, so that the coefficient of interest is the size of the discontinuity δ 1 . As discussed in Section 2, this measures a weighted average treatment effect where the weights are determined by the probability of being near GAP * ij = 0. Panel (A) of Table 4 show the values of δ 1 estimated from running regressions of the form given by 3, with the sample limited to students within 20 points of the threshold to make the assumption of linearity plausible. For the class of 2004, estimates of the discontinuity are all small and statistically insignificant, as expected. For the class of 2005, a large and highly significant discontinuity appears in the four-year college categories, and the estimates change little when demographic controls are added to the regressions, as should be the case with regression discontinuity designs. The estimates from this specification suggest that the scholarship induced 7.6% of winners to enroll in four-year public colleges and 5.6% of winners to leave four-year private colleges. Unlike the difference-in-difference approach, the regression discontinuity thus suggests that the scholarship did raise the proportion of students intending to attend college, by 2-3 percentage points. Panel (B) relaxes the linearity assumption, including all values of GAP * ij and fitting to each side of the threshold a quartic polynomial, the lowest degree polynomial not rejected at a 5% significance level by the goodness-of-fit statistic suggested by Lee and Card (2007) . Using the quartic specification, the class of 2004 again shows no discontinuities, while the class of 2005 shows 7.8% of winners switching between the four-year private and public college categories. Addition of demographic controls has nearly no effect on these estimates. These discontinuity estimates thus tell a similar story as the difference-in-difference estimates but imply a stronger effect of the scholarship. The simplest explanation for the discrepancy is that the discontinuity measures a local average treatment effect with heavier weights assigned to students likely to fall near the threshold. These are the least skilled of the winners, so it may be that lower skilled students react more strongly than higher skilled students.
Heterogeneity By Academic Skill
To test this hypothesis directly, I return to the difference-in-difference methodology but add one more layer of interactions with a measure of academic skill. To do this, I assign each student to one of 10 deciles within her class based on her total MCAS score. I then fully interact these decile indicators with all the terms in (1), so that β 1 is now a difference-in-difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of being a scholarship winner (compared to loser) in 2005 (compared to 2004) and in a given skill decile (compared to the other deciles). Because scholarship winners come from above the 60th percentile, Table 5 replicates Table 3 where each value of β 1 is derived from a separate regression treating each of the top four deciles as the omitted category.
A clear pattern emerges. About 12-13% of scholarship winners in the 60-79th skill percentiles switched from four-year private colleges to four-year public colleges, an effect that diminishes to 5-6% in the 80-89th percentiles and then disappears entirely in the 90-99th percentiles. These estimates are robust to inclusion of demographic controls in Panel (B) and the overall conclusions change little if β 2 (comparing 2004 to 2003, but not shown here) is subtracted from β 1 . Table 5 thus reveals that the original difference-in-difference estimate that 6% of winners switched college categories is an average of high responsiveness among the lowest skilled winners and little or no responsiveness among the most highly skilled winners. 11 This confirms that the regression discontinuity design captures an effect weighted more heavily for the lowest skilled scholarship winners.
The heterogeneity analysis also provides insight into the decision-making processes of high school graduates. The simplest explanation for the observed pattern of heterogeneity by academic skill is that students trade off quality and price when deciding which college to attend. Many of the highly skilled students have gained admission to selective private colleges of higher quality than the public colleges, so that the small price reduction the Adams Scholarship offers is insufficient to induce such a drop in quality. Conversely, for the lowest skilled winners, the perceived quality drop is smaller (or non-existent) so that a switch to the public sector given the price reduction is worthwhile. The pattern in Table 5 is suggestive, though not conclusive, that students are Each coefficient is from a separate regression with the given decile as the omitted category. Robust standard errors are clustered by school district (* p<0.05 ** p<0.01). Panels (B) and (C) include Table 2 's demographic controls fully interacted with class. In panels (A) and (B), N = 160,949. In panel (C), N = 23,479.
considering such price and quality tradeoffs when making college decisions. The heterogeneity by academic skill may also explain why poor students seem more price sensitive than other students, given that test scores and income are positively correlated. Panel (C) repeats panel (B)'s regressions, restricting the sample to poor students. Though the estimates are quite noisy because so few poor students win scholarships, the most precise estimates in the 60-69th and 70-79th percentiles are surprisingly similar to their counterparts in panel (B). Conditional on academic skill, there is little evidence that poor students reacted more strongly to the scholarships than did non-poor students, suggesting that poor students' higher price sensitivity may be picking up correlations between poverty and relatively low test scores.
Conclusions
In its first year, the Adams Scholarship spent $4 million on tuition waivers for over 3,000 students attending in-state public colleges. Nearly half of those attended U. Mass. Amherst, the most prestigious of the state's public postsecondary institutions. Most of the remaining students attended other U. Mass. campuses, so that nearly half of the entering freshmen classes were scholarship winners. This paper suggests that about 800 of those students, largely from the 60-79th percentiles of academic skill, would have attended four-year private colleges had the scholarship not existed. This translates into roughly $5,000 per student induced to switch into the public sector.
One critical question is whether these 800 students would have attended private colleges in Massachusetts or elsewhere. Though the SIMS data can not resolve this, the IPEDS Residence and Migration mentioned in Section 3 can be used to examine trends over time in the college choices of recent Massachusetts high school graduates as a whole. Though the IPEDS data is unfortunately noisy, there is no evidence after the scholarship's introduction of an increase in the fraction of those recent graduates attending in-state colleges. Though not conclusive, this suggests that the scholarship's primary effect is to move students from in-state private colleges to in-state public colleges.
Does Massachusetts benefit from the Adams Scholarship? First, the IPEDS data suggests that the original motivation for the scholarship may have been misplaced, in that the state does not suffer from brain drain. According to IPEDS, each year Massachusetts attracts roughly 5,000 more out-of-state students to its colleges than it loses of its own high school graduates to other states. Second, even if all 800 switching students would have otherwise attended out-of-state colleges, any benefit to the state would accrue only if in the long run students tend to settle where they attend college. Recent work by Groen (2004) shows, however, that only 10% of students induced to stay in-state by such financial incentives will remain in that state's labor market 10-15 years later. This means that the Adams Scholarship would annually add 80 college-educated workers to the state's workforce, at an annual cost of $50,000 per added worker. It seems implausible that the benefits to the state in additional tax revenue would exceed this amount, or that the proportion of college-educated workers would rise enough to induce the positive externalities documented by Moretti (2004) .
Possible improvements for Massachusetts are prompted by Table 6 , which decomposes college intentions by poverty status and quintile of academic skill for the class of 2004. Two facts are worth noting. First, poor students in the middle part of the skill distribution are 8 percentage points less likely to attend college than their non-poor peers, though that gap within quintiles is only half the size of the overall enrollment gap. Second, very few poor students win Adams Schol- arships because they are bunched very heavily at the low end of the skill distribution. These facts suggest two possible avenues for state policies to encourage more efficient production of human capital. First, Massachusetts could assign scholarships based on both merit and income, which might help target those students whose enrollment decisions are most price sensitive. Second, the state could direct more of its budget toward remedying the skill gaps that explain so much of the college enrollment gaps. Either of these plans could potentially be more efficient that the Adams Scholarship in its current form. They would also be more redistributive and thus would likely face more political opposition than a non-means tested merit aid program does, which may explain why such programs have proliferated in recent years. 
